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Abstract: 
For much of the history of the philosophy of religion it was generally accepted that 
God existed outside of time. Recently, however, many theologians have challenged 
the classical position that God exists outside of time and have instead argued for a 
temporal God. I argue that the concept of a temporal God is theologically and 
philosophically problematic, and in opposition to our best science. I first argue that a 
timeless existence is superior to that of a temporal existence, and that God as the most 
perfect being must therefore exist timelessly. I then argue a common objection raised 
against the idea of a timeless God, namely, the argument that a timeless God cannot 
relate to a temporal creation, is misguided and dependent on a scientifically dubious 
conception of time. I conclude by arguing that if one is to hold to the idea of a 
temporal God one must admit that God either had no reason to create when God 
chose to create or that God and creation have existed together co-eternally, and that 
this is problematic for the defender of divine temporality. I therefore conclude that a 
God that exists outside of time is superior both theologically/philosophically and 
better in line with our best scientific understanding of the world. 
 
 It is currently in vogue in theological circles to defend the position that God is 
“within” time, that is, that God experiences time in some manner that is similar to the 
way that you and I experience time. I refer to this position as divine temporality. 
Throughout this paper I use the arguments of William Lane Craig to represent the 
divine temporality position. Using Craig as the mouthpiece for divine temporality is 
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partly for simplicity’s sake, but Craig is also the most prolific, and arguably most 
respected, defender of this position. Thus this seems to be a fair simplification. Craig, 
and other defenders of divine temporality, argue that divine temporality is both 
theologically superior to divine timelessness, the view that God is outside of time, 
and that divine temporality is compatible with our best science. I argue that both of 
these conclusions are false. 
This paper is split into three sections, though before I jump into the three 
sections I provide a brief introduction to some of the key ideas covered in this paper, 
such as the A and B-series views of time. In the first section I argue that divine 
timelessness is theologically superior to divine temporality since divine timelessness 
ascribes a more perfect form of existence to God. Additionally, I argue that a timeless 
God is just as capable of interacting personally with creation, and that Craig’s 
arguments against the ability of a timeless God to interact with creation otherwise rest 
upon an A-series view of time. 
In the second section I argue that an A-series view of time is incompatible 
with our best science and thus ought to be rejected. Craig claims that the A-series can 
be reconciled with the special theory of relativity by appealing to a Lorentzian view 
of special relativity; I, however, I that there are good scientific reasons for rejecting a 
Lorentzian view of special relativity. Craig also attempts to argue that general 
relativity provides a way out for the defender of divine temporality, but, again, I 
argue that this claim is scientifically dubious and ultimately theologically 
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problematic. Craig’s appeal to general relativity is theologically problematic because 
it ultimately subjects him to a well known critique Leibniz brought against Newton.  
In the third and final section I present Leibniz’s critique and argue that Craig’s 
proposed solution is either straightforwardly contradictory or theologically 
unacceptable by Craig’s own standards. Leibniz’s critique is that if God exists within 
time, then God must either have had no reason for creation or God must be co-eternal 
with creation. Craig’s position is that God is “timeless sans creation” and “temporal 
since creation.” Though this is a clever attempt to avoid Leibniz’s critique, I argue 
that it ultimately fails. 
Thus, if I am successful, I show that, contrary to Craig’s position, divine 
timelessness is theologically superior to divine temporality, and divine temporality is 
both scientifically and theologically unacceptable. 
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A Very Short Introduction to God and Time 
 Defenders of divine timelessness and defenders of divine temporality can at 
least agree upon one thing: God is eternal. Disagreement arises once theologians try 
to understand what implications eternality has for the nature of God. The defender of 
divine timelessness argues that when we say that God is eternal, we are saying that 
God is, in some sense, outside of time. To make use of a popular analogy, imagine 
that all of time is a road, and that God is looking down on the road. God can see the 
entirety of the road at once; and the same is true of time. In this view God does not 
experience time but has eternally willed all divine actions; in fact, God can be 
understood (to the point that we can understand God) as one eternal divine action  
that brought everything into being and eternally sustains all things.1 This view is often 
motivated by the claim that God, by definition, is the most perfect being, and thus 
experiences the fullness/entirety of divinity all at once.2  
 Divine temporality, alternatively, places God within time. In this view God is 
still eternal, God has no beginning and end, and still is omniscient and omnipotent, 
but God does experience the flow of time and the changes that time brings about in a 
manner that is similar to the way that we experience time. Most defenders of divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. This could be read as stating that there is one moment in which God creates 
the universe, and then another moment in which God sustains the universe. If this 
were the case then God would be within time, since God would have experienced a 
temporal “before” and “after.” The correct interpretation, however, according to the 
defender of divine timelessness, is that God is causally and ontologically prior to the 
universe, but is not temporally prior to the universe, thus there is no temporal 
“before” and “after.” 2.	  This	  is	  the	  view	  famously	  argued	  for	  by	  Boethius	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temporality will, however, point out that God has a perfect memory of the past and 
perfect knowledge of the future, and thus God’s experience of time is superior to our 
experience of time. This view is generally motivated by worries that a God that exists 
outside of time appears impersonal, and thus is seemingly unable to respond to prayer 
or the sufferings/triumphs of God’s people. A God that is located in time is at least, 
on the face of things, much more accessible, and much more involved in the lives of 
God’s followers. Next I briefly explain the A and B-series views of time, and how 
they relate to divine temporality/timelessness.  
 The terms “A-series” and “B-series” first appear in a famous essay written by 
John McTaggart titled “The Unreality of Time.” In his essay, McTaggart 
distinguishes between two ways of referring to things in time.3 The first is merely to 
note the order of events using terms such as “earlier” and “later.” For example, we 
can talk about my graduation from high school occurring after my 6th birthday but 
before my decision to major in philosophy as an undergraduate. This way of referring 
to things in time is what McTaggart calls “permanent.” The label of permanent is 
applied because the order of past events will always remain fixed and, given that 
future events are determined, have always been fixed.4 These permanent temporal 
indicators, earlier and later, are referred to as B-series facts about time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. In the paper McTaggart actually discusses an A, B and C-series of time, but 
for the purposes of this paper we need only discuss the A and B-series.  
 
4. J.M.E. McTaggart. “The Unreality of Time.” In Time edited by Jonathan 
Westphal and Carl Levenson. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. p.88 
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 A-series facts about time include the familiar terms “past,” “present,” and 
“future.” The present is whatever one is currently experiencing, the past is whatever 
is before the present, and the future is whatever is after the present. A-series facts 
about time include B-series facts within them, since they refer to events being 
ordered, but add the terms past, present and future.5 To picture the difference between 
A and B-series facts, visualize a number line containing only whole numbers. The 
number line itself represents B-series facts, since the numbers are ordered from least 
to greatest. One can then understand A-series facts by imagining that someone began 
naming the whole numbers starting at one, and we stated that whatever number was 
being named was present, whatever number was before the present number was past, 
and whatever number came after the present number was future.  
Essentially everyone accepts that there are B-series facts about time. A-series 
facts, however, are controversial. The question is whether when I say, “I am now 
writing a paper” I am stating a true fact about the world. Put differently, if A-series 
facts are part of the fundamental nature of the universe, then there is a “flowing” or 
changing “now” that demarcates past and future. If an A-series is accepted as 
fundamental, then we must say that truth values about statements change. For 
example, it is true now that I am writing a paper, however in an hour when I go to bed 
that statement will be false. This is at least a prima facie contradiction, since one and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Ibid. 
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the same statement is both true and false.6 I will leave it to the A-theorists to show 
why this is not a contradiction. If only a B-series is true, however, there is no 
privileged “now” and no changing truth values. It is true that in 2012 I graduated 
college and that in 2013 I entered graduate school, and that has always been true. The 
question then is whether A-series facts actually exist (i.e. are ontologically real) or are 
merely a part of the phenomenology of our experience. The B-theorist will claim that, 
while we do experience the passage of time and A-series facts about time, A-series 
facts are not ontologically real but are rather an illusion produced by our 
psychological make-up.  
There are multiply different ways of interpreting A-series facts. Craig adheres 
to a particular interpretation known as presentism, or as he calls it the “dynamic 
theory of time.”7 A dynamic theory of time commits one to the existence of A and B-
series facts. That is to say that, at a fundamental, ontological level, events are both 
earlier than and later than each other, and either past, present or future. Additionally, 
a dynamic theory of time claims that only those events that are present are “real.” Past 
events were real, and future events will become real, but only events that are present 
actually exist.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Ibid, 103.	  
7. William Lane Craig “Timelessness and Omnitemporality” in God and 
Time: Four Views edited by Gregory Ganssle, pp. 129-160. Downers Grove, Illinois: 
Intervarsity Press, 2001. p. 177. 
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Divine timelessness only requires that B-series facts be true about the world.8 
For, while events are fundamentally ordered, no moment in time is any more “real” 
than any other moment in time. All moments in time, or “nows,” are created and 
sustained by the eternal act that is God, and there is no reason to privilege one “now” 
over another “now.” If, though, God is within time, then time is not only ordered, but 
there is a real reason to privilege one “now” over another “now.” For, the “now” that 
God is experiencing is “real,” and all other “nows” or moments in time are either past 
or future. Thus, if God is within time, it follows naturally that time is, at a 
fundamental, ontological level, an A-series.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. There are prominent theologians who defend theories that place God 
outside of time and acknowledge the existence of A-series facts about the world, 
however for the sake of space and clarity I will not discuss these views in my paper.	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Section I: The Case for Divine Timelessness 
In this second section I address two arguments. The first is an argument for 
divine timelessness, which I refer to as the “divine experience argument,” which 
argues that a timeless existence is superior to a temporal existence, and thus God 
must be timeless. The second argument, which I refer to as the relational argument, is 
one made by Craig which claims to show that if God is related to creation, then God 
must be temporal. The purpose of this section is to show that Craig’s only hope of 
responding to the first argument lies in the success of the relational argument, and 
that the relational argument ultimately fails.  
The Superiority of Timelessness 
The divine experience argument is fairly straightforward:  
1) God is the most perfect being and therefore has the most perfect type of 
existence [Or God is the source of being that possesses all perfections] 2) In a 
temporal existence the past and future are experientially unavailable 3) In a 
timeless existence all that exists is experienced “at once” in a “timeless 
moment”9 4) An existence that allows one to experience everything at once 
and avoids losing experiences to the past is superior to one that only 
experiences the present 5)Therefore, from 1 and 4, God is timeless.10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. As you can see here, our language is not very good at communicating 
timeless concepts.  
 
10. An alternative version of this argument can be made that is based on the 
fullness of God’s being. It could instead argue that if God is in time, then parts of 
God’s being are no longer available to God, since God is only experiencing the 
present but is made up of a multitude of temporal parts. Thus if God is in time the 
whole of God’s being is not available to God, something that no theist would want to 
hold to. However this version of the argument would be highly reliant on a 
perdurantist view of temporal parts, so I find that the argument is stronger when it is 
couched in terms of experience. 
10	  
	  
	  
This argument is one of the most common arguments for divine timelessness. It is 
promoted by theologians such as Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann,11 Brian 
Leftow12 and Paul Helm,13 and was first presented by Thomas Aquinas.14 The only 
really contentious premise is 4, since essentially all theologians agree on 1, and 2 and 
3, which merely describe what it means to exist either temporally or timelessly.  
 What reasons then do we have to think that a timeless existence would be 
superior to a temporal existence? One reason is that as we experience our passage 
through time, we are losing more and more of our past. As we age there are an 
increasing number of experiences that are no longer available to us. Perhaps at times 
we consider this a good thing, if for example we are no longer experiencing 
something negative; however, it does imply that we lack the power to go back in time 
and experience anew those things that we experienced in the past. Thus we are 
subject to time.  
 What does it mean to say that we are subject to time? When I state that we, as 
humans, are subject to time, I mean that we necessarily undergo certain experiences, 
namely, we experience the passage of time. We undergo this experience whether we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, ‘Prophecy, Past Truth, and 
Eternity’, Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), p. 395 
 
12. Brian Leftow, “Timelessness and Divine Experience.” Sophia 30 no.2-3 
(1991): 43-53. 
 
13. Ganssle, 29-30.  
 
14. Summa Theologica Question 10 in Summa of the Summa edited by Peter 
Kreeft, pp. 107-110. San Francisco, California: Ignatius Press, 1990.	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desire to or not, and we have no power to alter time’s effects on us. Time’s effects on 
us include, but are not limited to, our loss of the past and our inevitable march into 
the future. Though we may greatly desire to hold on to a particularly pleasurable 
moment, it is not in our power to do so. 
The fact that we are subject to time seems reasonable since we are finite, 
contingent creatures, however the same rationale cannot be applied when it comes to 
God. God is infinite and necessary,15 so to think that God is subject to time’s power is 
quite odd, to say the least. It is also troubling to think that God has an increasing 
number of experiences that are no longer available. This fact is troubling because, if 
God is in time, then as God moves through time all moments that are past are no 
longer available to God. These considerations lend a considerable amount of intuitive 
support to the idea that God is timeless, since nearly all theists will agree that God 
cannot be subject to anything else, including time, and many theists also agree that it 
is troubling to think that God is losing experiences as God moves through time.  
Brian Leftow has an additional argument in support of the divine experience 
argument. Leftow argues that when we first experience something, that experience is 
a novelty and we gain some pleasure from that novel sensation associated with a new 
experience.16 For us temporal creatures the novel sensation only occurs the first time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. The claim that God is necessary entails that God is not dependent on 
anything for existence. We, and the rest of creation are contingent, since we rely on 
God for our existence, however God is necessary because God accounts for God’s 
own existence.  
 
16. Timeless and Divine Experience, 50.	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that we have a new experience, and after the first experience of something the 
pleasure from the novel sensation wears off to some degree each time we have the 
experience in the future. A timeless being, however, would not experience events in a 
succession as we do, but instead would experience all things at once. Thus, a timeless 
being would always have the pleasure of having a novel experience, since there are 
no subsequent iterations of experiences to dull the pleasure associated with novel 
experiences. And, given that an experience with more pleasure is better than one with 
less pleasure ceteris paribus, this argument concludes that God would be timeless 
rather than temporal due to the increased pleasure available in a timeless existence.  
Though the divine experience argument may not appeal to everyone, many 
people throughout history have found it compelling. In fact, so does Craig. In each 
place that I have found where Craig addresses the divine experience argument, he 
ends his treatment of the argument by stating that the divine experience argument 
lends support to the divine timelessness position, but that divine temporality is overall 
still a superior position.17 Nevertheless, Craig has two general replies to the divine 
experience argument which he hopes makes the divine experience argument less 
appealing.  
Craig’s first reply is that there may be some advantages to a temporal 
existence, so a timeless existence is not as superior to temporal existence as one 
might think. Craig repeatedly (and exclusively) gives the example of music to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17. Ganssle, 64; Time and Eternity, 74; On the Argument for Divine 
Timelessness from the Incompleteness of Temporal Life, 171. 
 
13	  
	  
	  
illustrate this claim.18 The basic idea is that if one is properly to experience music, 
one must experience it as flowing in succession from beginning to end. A timeless 
being would be unable to experience music in this manner, since it involves a 
succession of events, thus in at least one way a temporal existence seems superior to a 
timeless existence.  
Craig’s second reply is to point out that, while a temporal God would “lose” 
the past in a certain sense, a temporal God would have a perfect memory and the 
perfect ability to recall anything God had experienced. He states, “When we recall 
that God is perfectly omniscient and so forgets absolutely nothing of the past and 
knows everything about the future, then time’s tooth is considerably dulled for 
Him.”19 The apparent conclusion of this reply, then, is that a temporal existence is 
much better for God than it is for us, and a timeless existence is not much better than 
a temporal existence.  
It is difficult to know what to make of Craig’s first reply, since he only briefly 
mentions it and only gives one example to illustrate his point. Though Craig does not 
discuss these, other possible examples of experiences that are superior for temporal 
beings are the pleasure associated with nostalgia and familiarity. For example, 
temporal beings can have the positive experience of nostalgia only because an 
experience occurred long ago and is now being recalled. Along the same lines, being 
familiar with something can be a positive experience, such as the re-watching of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. On the Argument for Divine Timelessness from the Incompleteness of 
Temporal Life, 171	  
19. Time and Eternity, 72.  
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favorite movie or re-reading of a favorite book. Clearly both of these things, the 
experience of nostalgia and the experience of familiarity would be unavailable to a 
timeless being, since a timeless being experiences things all at once rather than in a 
sequence.20 These two possibilities, and the example of music that Craig provides, do 
seem to show that there are certain advantages to a temporal existence, and may serve 
to cancel out the pleasure a timeless God could take in the novelty of new 
experiences.21 Thus, I concede that Craig’s first reply does serve to, at least 
somewhat, narrow the gap between the superiority of a timeless versus a temporal 
experience.  
Craig’s second reply, that God is omniscient and thus God’s loss of the past is 
less damaging than our loss of the past, effectively serves as a corrective for all those 
who did not take into account God’s divine attributes when they considered what a 
temporal divine existence would be like. Craig, however, never tries to argue that 
divine temporality is a superior existence to divine timelessness; rather, Craig argues 
that God’s experience of time is superior to our experience of time. Therefore, after 
accepting Craig’s reply, we are still left with the conclusion that a timeless existence 
is superior to a temporal existence. Though “time’s tooth is dulled” it still has a bite 
to it, and God still loses any experiences that occur to the past. More importantly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. It is not clear to me whether a temporal God could experience pleasure 
from nostalgia or familiarity either, however it seems at least possible that this could 
occur.  
 
21. Though, without measuring hedons, it is difficult to say whether to 
pleasures are equal or unequal.	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Craig does not address the troubling notion that a temporal God is, in some sense, 
subject to time, since God cannot go back in time and experience the past or move 
forward and experience the future. It is clear then, that even Craig would agree that a 
timeless existence is at least somewhat superior to a temporal existence.  
Craig does not seem to appreciate fully the ramifications of the divine 
experience argument. For, given that the divine experience argument is valid and that 
Craig agrees with each of the premises, he must then accept the conclusion; and, in 
this case, the conclusion is that divine timelessness is true! Clearly Craig is 
committed to the opposite of this position, namely, divine temporality. Given this 
argument’s validity, even soundness, how is Craig to maintain his commitment to 
divine temporality? The only option left available to Craig is to claim that divine 
timelessness is incompatible with some other divine attribute that is more important 
than God’s possession of the best possible form of existence. Though Craig does not 
state this position explicitly, it seems to be the route that Craig takes to avoid a 
commitment to divine timelessness. The rest of this section will be devoted to 
exploring which divine attribute Craig values more highly than God’s perfect 
existence.  
Underlying many of Craig’s arguments against divine timelessness is the idea 
that a timeless God is not a personal God. Craig’s two main objections to divine 
timelessness both relate to the idea that a timeless God is not a personal God. Craig’s 
first objection is that a timeless God would not be omniscient due to the fact that a 
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timeless God would not know any tensed facts.22 Craig’s second objection is that if 
God is to be meaningfully related to creation, then God must be temporal.23  
In what follows I mainly address the second objection, since, I argue, the first 
objection is in essence merely the claim that a timeless God is not personal. This is 
because the defender of divine timelessness can fairly easily avoid the first criticism 
by appealing to a B-theory of time and therefore showing that there are in fact no 
tensed facts to be known.24 This appeal neatly resolves the objection, however many 
still wonder whether God can be a personal God if God does not know anything 
regarding the temporality of creation. If it can be shown that a timeless God can 
meaningfully relate to creation, the worry associated with the first objection will be 
alleviated. 
Craig’s argument for the temporality of God based on God’s being a personal 
God consists of only three premises and a conclusion:  
1) God is creatively active in the temporal world 2) If God is creatively active 
in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world 3) If God is 
really related to the temporal world, God is temporal 4) Therefore, God is 
temporal.25 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. Ganssle, 146-153. 
 
23. Time and Eternity, 88.	  	  
24. Tensed facts are A-series facts, such as “It is now noon,” or “In the past I 
went to Disneyworld with my family.” The consistent B-theorist, however, need not 
worry about tensed facts since, according to B-theory, the experience of time is 
merely a phenomenological illusion, not something true about the world. 
 
25. Time and Eternity, 87. 
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Of the three premises, Craig thinks that the defender of divine timelessness must 
reject either 2 or 3. Thomas Aquinas, at least according to Craig, rejects the second 
premise, and claims that creation has a real relation to God, but that God does not 
have a real relation to the world.26 This position means that God, according to 
Aquinas, did not experience either an intrinsic or extrinsic change when the world 
came to be, rather God remained wholly unchanged by creation. 
Craig takes issue with Aquinas on several points, but since I will not be 
attempting to defend Aquinas’ position in this paper, I will for the sake of argument 
agree with Craig that Aquinas’ position is mistaken. Craig also puts forward and 
rejects two modern attempts27 to get around his argument that take issue with his third 
premise. Again, for the sake of argument I will agree with Craig that those attempts 
have failed. How then can the defender of divine timelessness respond to Craig’s 
argument?  
Here I offer two replies. The first comes from Paul Helm. Helm states, “A 
mere extrinsic relation is not sufficient to do the trick (i.e. make God temporal). God 
certainly has a relation to the creation, but what does this show? It certainly does not 
show that God must be temporal any more than if I think about the number seven for 
five minutes then the number seven is temporal.”28 Here Helm is making the point 
that he, a temporal being, can bring about an extrinsic change in a timeless entity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. Time and Eternity, 88.	  
27. The two modern attempts Craig addresses are formulated by 
Stump/Kretzmann and Brian Leftow. 
 
28. Ganssle, 162.	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namely the number seven, by thinking about it and yet the number seven remains 
timeless. Helm is challenging Craig’s claim that if a timeless being were to undergo 
even an extrinsic change the formerly timeless being would become temporal.  
Helm’s reply seems sufficient to problematize significantly Craig’s argument, 
however another reply is available to the defender of divine timelessness. This reply 
Craig himself recognizes, namely that Craig’s argument is dependent on an A-series 
conception of time. For, if a B-series conception of time is true, then all of time exists 
as if on a timeline, and a timeless God could have eternally willed everything that 
takes place. Thus, if a B-series view of time is accurate, there is no reason to think 
that in order for God to be related to creation God must be in time. Craig’s response 
to this is to state that a B-series view of time, “faces formidable philosophical and 
theological objections, not to mention the arguments that can be offered on behalf of 
a dynamic theory of time.”29 Elsewhere Craig argues that it is not capable to eliminate 
tense,30 and that our phenomenological experience of past, present and future, among 
other things, demand that an A-series view of time is correct.31 I will not address 
those arguments here; however, I do think there are some good reasons for thinking 
that Craig is mistaken, such as the contention that our experience of past, present and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. Ganssle, 164.  
 
30. William Lane Craig, “On Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types.” 
Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of 
Science 120.2 (1999): 265-270. 
 
31. William Lane Craig, “Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the 
Past and Future” Southern Journal of Philosophy 37.4 (1999): 515-537. 
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future is weakly emergent.32 I also will address in the next section why we have good 
scientific reasons for rejecting an A-series view of time. For the moment, then, I will 
merely note that for Craig’s argument to go through and prove the existence of a 
temporal God, an A-series conception of time must represent reality, and we have 
good reasons not to accept an A-series view of time.  
Let me briefly gesture at how a timeless God, given a B-series, could be 
related to the world, even though this point is not my main one. Again, if time is a B-
series, and God is timeless, then God has eternally, unchangingly willed all things. 
Clearly then, God knows, and has always known, everything that is to occur. If this is 
true then how could God interact with creation personally--answer someone’s prayer, 
for example? The short answer to this question provided by the defender of divine 
temporality is that God eternally was aware of the prayer, and has eternally willed a 
divine response to that prayer.33 
This position may strike some as odd, since it may not appear that God is 
genuinely interacting with creation. I argue, however, that if this position is 
problematic for divine timelessness, divine temporality experiences a similar 
problem. For, while divine temporality can claim that God’s response to a prayer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. This argument is presented by Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia in their 
paper “Time and Time Perception,” Topoi 34.1 (2015): 257-263.	  
33. This in turn raises questions regarding free will that are beyond the scope 
of this paper, however hopefully it seems plausible that a timeless God can interact 
with creation. A good discussion of God’s power and human freedom is provided by 
Herbert McCabe in his essay “Freedom” which can be found in the book God 
Matters. 
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occurs once the prayer is located in the past, defenders of divine temporality such as 
Craig also hold that God is omniscient and thus knows everything that will happen in 
the past, present and future. Given this, a temporal God also already knows that a 
prayer will be offered, and already knows what response will be given in response to 
that prayer,34 and the only difference is that the temporal God produces divine action 
while being located in time, while a timeless God has eternally willed divine action 
from outside of time.  
In conclusion, I argue that Craig cannot adequately deal with the divine 
experience argument, and is in trouble due to the fact that he appears to accept all of 
the premises of a valid argument that concludes that divine timelessness is true. 
Craig’s way out of this difficult position seems to be to claim that a timeless God is 
not a personal God, and that God’s status as a personal God is more important than 
God’s possession of the highest form of existence. The relational argument that Craig 
presents to attempt to prove the point that a timeless God is not personal, however, 
requires that an A-series view of time is true. And, in the next section I argue that we 
have good scientific reasons for rejecting an A-series. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34. There are some theologians who argue that God does not know the future 
for various reasons, however Craig is not one of them. And, while claiming that God 
does not know the future may solve some theological problems, it presents many 
more, such as whether God is actually omniscient and whether God can actually 
assure creation that evil will ultimately be defeated.	  	  
21	  
	  
	  
 
 
  
22	  
	  
	  
Section II: Time Is On My Side 
 Many theologians are skeptical of divine timelessness for theological reasons. 
While I think that their objections can be adequately answered, responding to such 
objections will not be my purpose in this section. What defenders of divine 
temporality fail to address adequately is the fact that there are serious scientific 
problems for divine temporality, since it is committed to an A-series view of time. 
Thus in this section I lay out the scientific objections to divine temporality and argue 
that defenders of divine temporality do not have an adequate response to these 
objections.  
  According to the best scientific theory currently available concerning time, 
namely, the theory of relativity introduced by Einstein, there is no reason to think 
that, at the fundamental nature of reality, A-theory facts exist. According to the theory 
of special relativity, time is a dimension akin to the three spatial dimensions, and our 
experience of the passage of time is correlated to how quickly we are moving through 
the spatial dimensions. For those of us traveling rather slowly, and by slowly I mean 
significantly less than the speed of light, time proceeds forward “normally.” Once one 
begins to approach the speed of light, however, time “slows down” considerably. This 
phenomenon, known as time dilation, is well documented scientifically. The trouble 
here is that there is no reason to privilege any observer’s point of view, so we cannot 
say whose passage of time is “real” or “accurate.”35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. Presumably one could say “Well can’t we just agree that we can privilege 
the passage of time experienced by someone who is at rest?” This solution, however, 
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 Hilary Putnam demonstrates how time dilation is a problem for the defender 
of the A-series view. He points out that, given special relativity, we cannot make 
sense of a privileged “now” that picks out what is real.36 We are unable to privilege 
any particular now due to the time dilation that I discussed in the previous paragraph. 
I will attempt to illustrate his point. Imagine that there are two people walking 
parallel to one another at the same rate, and that the two people’s progress is being 
recorded on a graph with an x and y axis. In this case that the x-axis represents time 
and the y-axis represents the spatial dimensions. If the two people remain walking 
parallel to each other and at the same rate their x coordinates will remain the same at 
any given time, such that we could connect their x-coordinates with a vertical line 
(Figure A). If, however, one of the two people were to change direction or change 
speed a line connecting their x-coordinates would become diagonal to some degree 
(Figure B). In this illustration the line connecting the two people represents what the 
person is experiencing as “now.” If the two people remain moving at exactly the same 
rate in exactly the same direction then we can say that there is only one “now,” 
however once either person changes direction or speed we get two “nows” that are 
not in sync with one another. Once this happens what is “now” for one observer will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
does not work, since within special relativity we cannot say who is at rest and who is 
in motion. All motion is relative to some other observer (or potential observer), but 
we have no reason to privilege one observer’s point of view, thus we can never say 
definitely that one point of view is “at rest” and another is “in motion,” we can only 
say that relative to some observer I am either at rest or in motion.  
 
36. Hilary Putnam. “Time and Physical Geometry.” In Philosophical Papers, 
Vol. 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979.	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be future for the other observer, and since we have no reason to privilege one 
observers experience over the other, we cannot say which “now” is absolute. 
Therefore, there is no privileged “now,” and thus no privileged “now” flowing 
through time, which is what is required by an A-series view of time.37 
 
  Figure A           Figure B 
Also included within the theory of relativity is the concept of reference 
frames. A reference frame is the point of view for any observer, and reference frames 
can be either inertial or non-inertial. Reference frames are considered inertial when 
they are going the same speed relative to one another. For example, when two cars 
are driving down the highway next to one another at the same speed, each car 
represents an inertial reference frame. Non-inertial reference frames occur when two 
reference frames are accelerating relative to one another. An example of this is when 
a rocket ship blasts off from Earth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37. Without a privileged “now” in time, there is merely a large number of 
inertial frames. This presents a problem for the defender of divine temporality, 
because they seemingly must claim either that God is in one or all inertial frames. As 
we shall see later in the paper, neither of these positions are desirable.  
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The idea of reference frames is not first presented in Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, however Einstein was the first one to show that we have no reason to 
privilege one reference frame over another. Thus, in the example given regarding 
non-inertial reference frames, we can either think of the rocket ship as accelerating 
off of Earth and Earth being at rest, or we can picture Earth accelerating away from 
the rocket ship while the rocket ship is at rest. The math works either way. Prior to 
Einstein there was a postulated substance known as aether, which was absolutely at 
rest and permeated the entire universe. Using the aether, it was thought that one could 
determine whether something was absolutely at rest or absolutely in motion, for if 
you were at rest relative to the aether you were absolutely at rest and if you were in 
motion relative to the aether then you were in absolute motion. Einstein, however, 
showed that we had no reason to postulate an aether, and that we can only speak 
about things being in motion or at rest in a relative sense, that is, relative to other 
reference frames. Thus, since there exists no objective reference frame, we are unable 
to claim that any reference frame is in motion or at rest, and we are unable to 
privilege the experience of time in any reference frame.  
I will now turn to Craig’s attempt to show that divine temporality is a tenable 
position given the theory of special relativity (STR). Craig presents the argument 
facing the defender of divine temporality as follows:  
1) STR is correct in its description of time. 2) If STR is correct in its 
description of time, then if God is temporal, He exists in either the time 
associated with a single inertial frame or the times associated with a plurality 
of inertial frames. 3) Therefore, if God is temporal, He exists in either the time 
associate with a single inertial frame or the times associated with a plurality of 
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inertial frames. 4) God does not exist in either the time associated with a 
single inertial frame or the times associated with a plurality of inertial frames. 
5) Therefore, God is not temporal.38  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, Craig agrees with premises 2-4. He concedes that if STR 
accurately describes time, then God must exist in either one or a plurality of inertial 
frames, and that both of these options are unacceptable. The former threatens God’s 
omniscience, and the latter seemingly either turns God’s mind into that of a 
schizophrenic’s or opens up the possibility for an odd brand of polytheism.39 Thus, 
Craig argues, the if one is to successfully defend divine temporality one must deny 
that STR accurately describes time.  
 Craig presents two general arguments which attempt to show that STR does 
not accurately describe time. His first argument consists of advocating for a 
Lorentzian view of relativity, with the cosmic background radiation serving as a 
stand-in for aether. Here I will briefly outline what this entails.  
Prior to Einstein’s theory of relativity Hendrik Lorentz, a Dutch physicist, 
developed a similar theory, which was the basis for Einstein’s theory. Lorentz’s 
theory, in contrast with Einstein’s, allowed for absolute simultaneity and absolute 
space by appealing to the presence of an “aether,” which filled the whole universe, 
was completely at rest and served as the medium for light to travel through.40 Though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to 
Time. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Press, 2001. p. 44.  
39. Ibid.  
 
40. Ibid, 54-57.  
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we now know that light does not require an “aether” to travel through, Craig argues 
that cosmic background radiation (CBR) can serve as a type of aether.  
Briefly, CBR is an aftereffect of the Big Bang, and it manifests as microwave 
radiation that permeates the universe.41 Thus, Craig argues, since there is something, 
namely CBR, that can serve as an objective inertial frame, we can make sense of the 
existence of absolute simultaneity/absolute time (i.e. an A-series view of time) if we 
adopt a Lorentzian interpretation of relativity. An A-series view of time is tenable due 
to the fact that we no longer need to rely on observers’ conflicting experiences of 
time in subjective reference frames; instead, we can appeal to, and privilege, the 
objective reference frame provided for us by the CBR.  
There are at least two problems with Craig’s argument. The first is that it is 
not clear how the CBR could serve as a stand in for aether. The CBR, while being 
remarkably uniform throughout the universe, does exhibit some variation in energy 
throughout the universe, and is expanding throughout the universe.42 Given that the 
CBR is not uniform and is in motion, it seems odd to claim that the CBR can serve as 
a substitute for aether, which was said to be absolutely uniform and motionless. 
Additionally, and more importantly, Einsteinian special relativity has a 
significant theoretical edge over Lorentzian special relativity. That is, there are good 
scientific reasons for choosing Einsteinian special relativity over Lorentzian special 
relativity. In order to understand these reasons, however, we must first review the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41. Ibid, 57.	  	  
42. http://lambda.gsfc.nasa.gov/product/cobe/ 
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criteria for a good scientific theory. Though the scientific community is not entirely in 
agreement regarding what constitutes a good theory, two criteria that are widely 
agreed upon are simplicity and fruitfulness.43 These are two of the criteria used to 
judge between theories that fit the scientific data equally well, or in other terms, are 
not falsified by the scientific data.  
The criterion of simplicity simply states that as a theory requires more 
presuppositions to get off the ground, the theory becomes less appealing. It also 
includes the idea that a theory ought to proceed logically from its presuppositions, 
and not require ad hoc additions. Fruitfulness is a measure of whether a theory leads 
to additional discoveries and in general moves forward the scientific project of 
understanding the natural world. While fruitfulness is somewhat difficult to quantify, 
it is clear that certain scientific theories have led to great advancements in their field. 
One example of this is the Copernican revolution and the heliocentric model of the 
solar system it proposed, which ultimately led to the development of modern 
astronomy.  
Based on the two criteria just discussed I argue that Einsteinian special 
relativity is vastly superior to Lorentzian special relativity. To demonstrate this 
superiority I appeal to Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen’s paper Presentism and 
Relativity. When Craig appeals to Lorentzian special relativity he has two options to 
choose from and both are problematic. Craig’s first option is to adhere to a version of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43. These are found in Thomas Kuhn’s Essay “Objectivity, Value Judgment 
and Theory Choice” and are generally agreed to be among those qualities that a good 
scientific theory possesses.	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Lorentzian special relativity developed by the physicist Adolf Grünbaum in the 
1970s. In order to develop this theory Grünbaum simplified Lorentz’s original theory 
and added to it the contraction hypothesis and the clock retardation hypothesis.44 
Grünbaum developed this as a “toy model”45 in order to prove a point about 
Lorentzian relativity, however, Grünbaum never intended for the theory to be used as 
a serious alternative to Einsteinian special relativity.46 And there is good reason for 
this reluctance, since not only does one need to add the contraction and clock 
retardation hypothesis to Lorentzian relativity to make it empirically accurate, the 
Einstein-Poincaré convention and Lorentz invariance must also be assumed.47 These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Very briefly, the contraction hypothesis states that when something is 
moving relative to an observer the object in motion will be shorter, and the clock 
retardation hypothesis accounts for the fact that a moving clocks time keeping is 
retarded when compared to the time measurement of a clock “at rest.” 
 
45. A toy model in physics is a simplified model or theory used to either 
simplify equations or prove a theoretical point. Toy models are not thought to 
represent reality.  
 
46. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen,"Presentism and Relativity." British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, no. 2 (2003): 341-342. 
 
47. The Einstein-Poincaré convention deals with synchronizing clocks using 
light, and Lorentz invariance is the idea that “the laws of physics are invariant under a 
transformation between two coordinate frames moving at constant velocity with 
respect to each other.” Put a different way, Lorentz invariance states that if two 
inertial frames are moving in the same direction, at the same speed, the laws of 
physics work the same way in both frames of reference, as do any valid 
transformations of the laws of physics. (This explanation was obtained from an open 
course at the Missouri University of Science and Technology, the relevant 
information can be found here: 
http://web.mst.edu/~hale/courses/Physics_357_457/Notes/Lecture.3.Relativity.Lorent
z.Invariance/Lecture3.pdf) 
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additions to the “toy model” are extremely ad hoc, giving us good scientific reasons 
to prefer the Einsteinian interpretation of relativity.   
Craig’s second option regarding Lorentzian relativity is to appeal to a neo-
Lorentzian interpretation of relativity. The neo-Lorentzian interpretation is flawed 
because it assumes that space and time are equivalent dimensions,48 and Lorentzian 
invariance is taken as a brute fact.49 Lorentzian invariance is explained in Einsteinian 
special relativity by the fact that all physical laws have a “common origin,” namely 
the “space-time structure.”50 Because two core aspects of neo-Lorentzian relativity 
theory remain unexplained, namely the equivalency of time and space and Lorentz 
invariance, the neo-Lorentzian interpretation has significantly less explanatory power 
than Einsteinian relativity.  
Thus, in both cases Einsteinian relativity is scientifically preferable when 
compared to Lorentzian relativity. Both versions of Lorentzian relativity require 
additional assumptions and/or ad hoc additions that are not required in Einsteinian 
relativity. Additionally, Einsteinian relativity has been adopted by the vast majority of 
the scientific community, and it has contributed to many of the scientific advances 
that have occurred since the early 1900s when it was originally formulated. To 
emphasize the vast difference between an Einsteinian and Lorentzian view of 
relativity Balashov and Janssen state:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48. Balashov and Janssen, 339-340. 
49. Ibid, 342.  
 
50. Ibid.  
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We claim … that the argument from physics against Craig's metaphysically-
motivated proposal is on a par with the argument against proposals to return to 
the days before Darwin in biology or the days before Copernicus in 
astronomy.51 
 
Thus, Craig’s first attempt to circumvent STR seems doomed to failure since there are 
weighty reasons for preferring the Einsteinian interpretation of relativity.  
In Craig’s second attempt to reject an STR interpretation of time, Craig 
appeals to the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), and a concept contained within 
GTR called cosmic time. Recall that within STR there are different reference frames 
based on the differing speeds of observers, and that there is no reason to privilege one 
reference frame over another. Thus, STR concludes that there is no absolute time, 
there is merely time as it is observed in different reference frames. Craig, however 
argues that this is a hasty conclusion, since STR only deals with bodies in uniform 
motion and thus is restricted to certain contexts.52 Since we are looking for the nature 
of motion in all contexts, we should instead look at GTR, which is, per its name, more 
general and therefore applicable to the nature of time in the universe as a whole.  
 Once one is considering GTR something interesting results. GTR points out 
that we cannot distinguish between gravity and what we normally think of as 
acceleration, and then argues that instead of thinking of gravity in a traditional sense, 
we should think of gravity as the “acceleration of objects in space-time.”53 The 
consequences of this new way of looking at gravity are often illustrated by imagining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51. Ibid, 330.	  	  
52. Time and Eternity, 57.  
 
53. Ibid, 58.	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the universe as a level sheet pulled taut. If we were to roll a ball across said sheet, the 
ball would roll in a straight line. If, however, before we rolled the ball across the 
sheet we placed objects of various weights on the sheet, the ball would be pulled 
towards the other objects on the sheet, since the other objects sitting on the sheet 
would create dips on the sheet. 
In this example the ball rolling across the sheet represents some object with 
mass moving through space, for our purposes let’s say it is a comet. The other objects 
on the sheet are other objects with mass such as planets and stars, the sheet represents 
the fabric of space-time and the dips the other objects create in the sheet are 
distortions of space-time. So, when the comet is moving through the universe, it is not 
“pulled” by gravity towards other objects, rather it is accelerated towards other 
massive objects due to the other object’s distortion of space-time. 
The preceding example was illustrating how things work according to GTR in 
a static universe. In an expanding universe such as ours, things get even stranger. In 
an expanding universe things such as galaxies are stationary, and space itself is 
expanding between the different galaxies.54 The consequence of this is that observers 
in galaxies, such as us, are at rest and capable of determining a kind of absolute or 
cosmic time. Once he introduces the concept of cosmic time, Craig argues that a 
temporal God could exist in cosmic time. This position is not susceptible to the two 
problems encountered when we considered a temporal God in the light of STR. A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54. Ibid, 62.  
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temporal God in cosmic time is certainly not at risk of devolving into polytheism or a 
schizophrenic mind, and also is seemingly not at risk of losing divine omniscience, 
since a temporal God in cosmic time exists in the prefered/privileged space-time.55  
Here I will only briefly comment on the physics of GTR, since it is physics 
that is far beyond my ability to grapple with at anything other than an extremely 
superficial level. It should be noted, however, that the cosmic time that Craig wishes 
to make use of only appears in idealized GTR cosmological models, that is GTR 
cosmological models that are homogenous and isotropic.56 And, while our universe 
appears homogenous on a cosmic scale, it is clearly the case that our universe is not 
actually homogenous due to the presence of galaxies and other clusters of matter. 
Also, while some may view the universe as being isotropic, Craig cannot view the 
universe as isotropic for the following reason: included within GTR is the idea that 
time and space are equivalent dimensions; however, as an A-theorist, Craig must hold 
that time is not isotropic, and instead state that the “direction of time is forward into 
the future, not backward into the past.”57 Thus Craig’s attempt to make use of cosmic 
time in our actual universe is suspect, since cosmic time would not come about in our 
universe due to its heterogeneous nature. Additionally, cosmic time would not appear 
in the sort of universe argued for by Craig because of Craig’s commitment to an 
anisotropic universe.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55. Ibid, 65.	  	  
56. Isotropic, at least when used in physics, is a term used to denote that a 
force is not changed based on which direction it travels. Balashov and Janssen, 342.  
 
57. William Lane Craig, “Why is it Now?” Ratio 13, no. 2 (2000): 121.  
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Even given GTR and the existence of cosmic time, though, Craig is still in 
trouble. My objection is one that Craig anticipates, though I argue that he ultimately 
is unable to deal with it. After discussing GTR and arguing that a temporal God could 
exist in cosmic time Craig notes that defenders of divine timelessness may think that 
they now have a way around Craig’s argument, since cosmic time had a beginning. 
Because cosmic time had a beginning, if God exists within cosmic time, it seems to 
follow that God had a beginning, and is therefore not eternal.58 In reply, Craig states, 
“The Newtonian will be unfazed by this objection, however, for he may plausibly 
construe cosmic time as but an empirical measure of God’s time since the moment of 
creation.”59 By this Craig means that the defender of divine temporality can avoid this 
objection, and the theologically catastrophic conclusion that God had a beginning, by 
claiming that the cosmic time contained within GTR is merely a measure of time that 
comes into existence when God creates the universe, and that prior to creation God 
existed within absolute time, a time that exists merely because of God’s being.  
I argue that this reply leaves Craig in a bind. Firstly, it is ontologically costly 
for Craig to posit the existence of absolute time based solely on his belief that God 
exists within time. While there is no way to disprove such a position, the fact that 
Craig must posit absolute time in order to make his theology work lends support to a 
position such as divine timelessness which has no need for such ontological excesses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58. Time and Eternity, 65.  
 
59. Ibid.	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However, even if Craig is granted his absolute time, Craig faces a problem: if 
God has existed eternally within absolute time, why did God choose to create when 
God chose to create? This critique was originally leveled at Newton by Leibniz. This 
critique puts the defender of divine temporality in a position where they must either 
claim that God did not have a good reason to create, which seems unreasonable, or 
that God and the universe are co-eternal, a position that is problematic for Craig in 
multiple ways. Addressing Leibniz’s critique and presenting a positive argument for 
divine timelessness is the purpose of the next section  And, as we will see, Craig 
agrees that this is a serious problem for the defender of divine temporality.60 Thus, if 
Craig wishes for God to exist within absolute time, he must provide a satisfactory 
solution to the critique just mentioned, and I argue in the next section that no such 
solution is available to him.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60. “The question ‘Why did God not create the world sooner?’ is 
unanswerable given the infinitude of the past.” William Lane Craig, “God and the 
Beginning of Time.” International Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 1 (2001): 31. 
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Section III: The Trouble with Divine Temporality 
The philosophical/theological argument I bring against divine temporality 
comes from Leibniz’s response to Newton’s claim that God exists within absolute 
time.61 By absolute time, Newton meant that time fundamentally consisted of the 
“flow” of a “now,” or, in modern terms, Newton was arguing for the existence of an 
A-series. For Newton, there existed both a time and space that were independent of 
anything else, from which one could talk about the absolute passage of time (i.e. the 
flow of the “now”) or absolute movement/rest. Leibniz, in his essay “Time is a 
Relation” challenges Newton’s idea of absolute time by stating that if something such 
as absolute time existed it would either 1) be impossible to make sense of why God 
created when God chose to create or 2) demonstrate that God and the universe co-
exist.62  
Leibniz’s challenge to Newton can be put into a trilemma. If God exists within 
absolute time, God either chose to create at no moments in time, some moments in 
time or all moments in time. Clearly the first of these options is not desirable, since 
the universe clearly exists and the theist maintains that God is the cause of the 
universe. The second is problematic because, as was stated previously, it is 
impossible to make sense out of why God would choose to create at a particular 
moment. One cannot make sense out of why God chose to create at a particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61. Yes, this is the Leibniz and Newton of calculus fame.  
 
62. G.W. Leibniz, “Time is a Relation.” In Time, edited by Jonathan Westphal 
and Carl Levenson, p.45. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.	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moment in absolute time because prior to creation there was no difference in content 
between any moments in absolute time, thus there would be no reason to chose one 
moment over another moment for the act of divine creation. Thus, if the second 
option is chosen, it must be admitted that God had no reason for choosing when to 
perform the act of creation. The final option, that God creates at all moments, leads to 
the conclusion that God and the universe are co-eternal, because if God exists in all 
moments and creates in all moments, God is never without creation.    
Underlying Leibniz’s critique are two presuppositions. The first is that God 
chose freely to create the world, and could have chosen otherwise. That God chose to 
create freely is nearly universally accepted among theists. The second presupposition 
is the principle of sufficient reason. This principle states that there must be a reason 
for everything, so in this case that there must be a reason for God to create the 
universe when God chose to create it.63  
Craig’s response to Leibniz’s critique focuses on the second option, which 
states that God chose to create at some moments in time, so before I begin evaluating 
Craig’s response, I turn to an evaluation of the third option available to the defender 
of divine temporality, namely, that God creates in all moments and thus is co-eternal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63. Some may object to Leibniz’s use of the principle of sufficient reason in 
this argument, however for my purposes I do not need to support a full fledged 
principle of sufficient reason, instead I could appeal to a divine principle of sufficient 
reason, which only claims that for any action God takes there must be a sufficient 
reason. This is presumably less controversial since God is, according to Christian 
theology, supremely rational and omniscient. For a modern defense of the principle of 
sufficient reason see The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment by 
Alexander Pruss.  
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with creation. I address this option here because some have viewed it as a 
theologically defensible option, yet I argue that it is not theologically defensible for 
Craig for at least two reasons.  
The first reason is that Craig finds it theologically necessary that creation 
occurred temporally prior to God’s continuing preservation of the universe. Craig 
claims that any position that is incapable of making a temporal distinction between 
creation and preservation is inadequate. When critiquing divine timelessness, Craig 
argues that if one accepts divine timelessness one must also accept an “emasculated 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.64 This inadequacy is due to the fact that, according to 
Craig, an account of creation based on divine timelessness entails that God is not 
temporally prior to creation, and thus creation is reduced to “the ontological 
dependence of the universe on God.”65 What Craig is concerned with here is the 
“ordinary language of the biblical authors,” which describes God as existing “‘before’ 
the world began.”66 This criticism, however sounds rather odd coming from Craig, 
since when Craig attempts to save his own position from contradiction he claims that 
God is not temporally prior to the universe, but rather casually prior, as we will see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64. Ganssle, 65. 
 
65. Ibid. It is not clear that Craig is correct on this point, as Helm argues in 
response that according to divine timelessness it is possible for God to be eternally 
timeless and for the universe to have a first moment, however I will not at present 
take issue with Craig’s statement (Ganssle, 84).  
 
66. Ibid, 66.	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shortly.67 So, while some theologians are content to merely claim that God is 
ontologically prior to the universe, and that the universe is dependent on God but still 
co-eternal with God, this route is not available for Craig.  
Additionally, Craig cannot accept that the universe and God are co-eternal 
since Craig subscribes to the Kalam cosmological argument.68 Briefly, the Kalam 
cosmological argument states that: 1) the universe had a beginning 2) all things that 
have a beginning have a cause 3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. Craig finds this 
argument to be a compelling reason to believe in a creator, however, it obviously does 
not get off the ground if the universe and God are co-eternal. Thus, if Craig were to 
ascribe to the third option of the trilemma, and claim that God and the universe are 
co-eternal, he would lose access to a compelling argument for theism.  
Given that the first option is not available to Craig, namely that God does not 
create in any moments, and the third option is not available to Craig, must he accept 
the second option and admit that God’s decision to create was without reason? In his 
essay “Timelessness and Omnitemporality” Craig addresses this problem for the A-
theorist. Craig formulates the argument as follows:  
1) If the past is infinite, then at t God delayed creating until t+n. 2) If at t God 
delayed creating until t+n, then he must have had a good reason for doing so 
3) If the past is infinite, God cannot have had a good reason for delaying at t 
creating until t+n 4) Therefore if the past is infinite, God must have had a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67.	  	  Ibid,	  186.	  
 
68. Craig has written extensively on the Kalam cosmological argument, and in 
fact he wrote a book exclusively defending the argument titled “The Kalam 
Cosmological Argument,” published by Macmillan in 1979.  
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good reason for delaying at t and God cannot have had a good reason for 
delaying at t. 5) Therefore the past is not infinite.69 
 
Craig, and here I agree with him, takes the above argument to show that God could 
not have existed throughout an infinite amount of time and had a good reason to 
create at only some but not all moments, and thus the defender of divine temporality 
is seemingly in trouble. It seems that if one is to stick to divine temporality one must 
either deny that God is eternal, something no theologian wishes to do, or claim that 
God, the most perfect of all beings, does not have a good reason for performing a 
divine action, in this case the act of creation. Craig, however, thinks that he can find a 
solution to this problem.  
 Craig’s solution, as I mentioned previously, is to argue that without the 
universe God was timeless, and that when God created God entered into time. If God 
is timeless prior to creation and temporal after creation Craig can seemingly bypass 
the trilemma while maintaining that God currently exists within time and that time is 
an A-series. Thus, if he is successful, Craig gets some of the benefits of divine 
timelessness, while at the same time he is able to claim that God exists within time. 
I argue that Craig’s response is fatally flawed, because it either commits him 
to a contradiction or, if Craig is successful in avoiding the contradiction, then Craig’s 
position reduces to the third option out of the trilemma, namely that God creates at all 
moments in time.70  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69. Timelessness and Omnitemporality, 153-154.	  	  
70. Ganssle, 65. 
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First, I argue that Craig’s position is contradictory. Though Craig works hard 
to avoid using temporal language, and thus avoid a contradiction, it is not clear that 
Craig’s attempts to avoid contradiction are successful. For, as Paul Helm points out, if 
God’s existence “outside” of time can be said to be before God’s existence in time, 
then there is in fact no point where God is actually timeless.71 Using Helm’s critique 
we can derive a formal contradiction in Craig’s view:  
1) To be in time is to stand in real temporal relationships with events, such as 
“before” or “after” 2) God is “timeless” or “outside” of time before the 
creation of the universe, after which God enters into time 3) using (1) and (2) 
we can conclude that before creation God was “inside” time, since God was 
existing before an event, namely the creation of the universe 4) Therefore, 
God is both “timeless” or “outside” of time before creation from (2) and God 
was “inside” time before the creation of the universe from (3), which is clearly 
a contradiction 
 
When Craig is confronted with contradiction, he seemingly backpedals and 
claims that God is “causally but not temporally prior to creation.”72 However, after 
stating that God is casually but not temporally prior to creation, and again denying 
that he affirms the argument outlined above, he states in closing, “My position is that 
God is timeless sans creation and temporal since creation.”73 Perhaps this closing 
statement does indeed avoid a contradiction, but it is not clear how. To better 
understand what Craig is up to a further analysis of his word usage is required, 
specifically the word “since.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71. Ganssle, 163. This argument was first brought to my attention by William 
Bell.  
 
72. Ibid, 186.  
 
73. Ibid.	  	  
42	  
	  
	  
When Craig claims that God is temporal “since” creation, what does he mean? 
In English the word since can be used in three different ways, either as an adverb, a 
preposition or as a conjunction. Both the adverbial and prepositional definitions of 
“since” include temporal language within the definition; as an adverb “since” is 
defined as “before now” and as a preposition “since” is defined as “between a past 
time and the present.” Thus, Craig must be using “since” as a conjunction, because 
the other two uses clearly commit Craig to temporal language and, as we have seen, a 
contradiction.  
“Since” as a conjunction can mean “because,” and is used to link a cause and 
an effect. This is the only definition of since that does not obviously contain a 
reference to time, so it is the definition that Craig must intend when he uses the word 
“since.” In this case Craig’s statement that God is “temporal since creation” means 
that the act of creation causes God to become temporal.74 Presumably then, as God 
creates, God creates time and simultaneously enters into time. This state of affairs, 
however, entails that creation has existed at every possible time, since the creation of 
the universe and the creation of time are simultaneous. Thus, it seems that Craig is 
committed to the third option of the trilemma, namely that God and the universe are 
co-eternal, and we have already seen that this position is one that Craig cannot hold.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74. This position may also cause trouble for Craig, as it seems as though God 
is, in the sense discussed previously, subject to creation, since creation causes God to 
become temporal. And, God’s being subject to anything is problematic for theists.  
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Additionally, given the omniscience of God, there is good reason to think that 
prior to creation God is temporal, at least in Craig’s view. This argument goes as 
follows:  
1) God is omniscient 2) If God is omniscient then God knows all things, 
including the moment of creation 3) Thoughts in the mind of God are 
sufficient to bring about the existence of time, since they entail change 4) 
Prior to creation God is counting down to creation 5) If God is counting down 
to creation, then change is occurring in the thoughts of God 6) Therefore, 
since change is occurring in the thoughts of God, time exists and God is 
located within time   
 
Craig is clearly committed to 1 and 2, and Craig explicitly states 3, namely that 
thoughts in the mind of God are sufficient to bring about time since they entail 
change.75 Thus, seemingly the only premise that Craig can attack is the fourth, since 5 
and 6 follow from the first four premises.  
 Perhaps Craig would wish to deny the fourth premise, but seemingly the only 
way to deny this premise is to maintain that, while God is aware of the impending act 
of creation, God chooses not to think about it. This is an odd claim, and it is not clear 
that, given the infinite mental capacities of God, it is possible for God to ignore 
pieces of information while maintaining omniscience. Thus, it seems that there is no 
good way out of the preceding argument for Craig, and Craig must admit that prior to 
creation God does in fact exist within time. And, if this is true, Craig’s claim that God 
is “timeless sans creation” clearly commits him to a contradiction. Additionally, if it 
is true that God is in time prior to creation, Craig has made no progress, and instead 
finds himself committed to the second option of the trilemma, namely that God 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75. Time and Eternity, 66.	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creates at some moments in time but not others, which in turn commits Craig to the 
position that God did not have a good reason for choosing a moment of creation.  
 Thus, Craig’s attempt to avoid the trilemma fails. Since Craig wishes to 
defend the position that God is in time, Craig must choose which bullet he wishes to 
bite, either choosing to admit that God performed an action without reason or 
choosing to admit that God and the universe are co-eternal. And, since the first option 
is a violation of God’s perfect reason, and the second is an option unavailable to 
Craig, I argue that divine temporality is theologically inadequate.  
  
Conclusion 
Based on the arguments provided, I conclude that divine timelessness is 
superior to divine temporality both scientifically and theologically. In the first section 
I argue that divine timelessness ascribes a superior type of existence to God, and that 
a timeless God is capable of interacting in a personal way with creation. In the second 
section of this paper I argue that the view that God is in time, divine temporality, is 
flawed due to its reliance on a scientifically dubious view of time, namely an A-series 
view of time. An A-series is scientifically dubious because it goes against our best 
picture of reality, namely, the theory of relativity. In the third section I argue that 
divine temporality is either unable to make sense out of why God created when God 
chose to create or must accept what Craig refers to as an “emasculated doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo.”  
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If all of my arguments in this paper go through, I have provided scientific, 
philosophical, and theological reasons for adhering to divine timelessness. At the 
least, however, I hope to have shown that divine temporality ought not to be the 
default position of the theologian, and that if one is to hold to divine temporality 
she/he needs to do some work to square that position with the best information we 
currently have available to us.    
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